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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of modeling com-
plex domains of actions and change within high-
level action description languages. We inves-
tigate two main issues of concern: (a) can we
represent complex domains that capture together
different problems such as ramifications, non-
determinism and concurrency of actions, at a
high-level, close to the given natural ontology of
the problem domain and (b) what features of such
a representation can affect, and how, its compu-
tational behaviour. The paper describes the main
problems faced in this representation task and
presents the results of an empirical study, carried
out through a series of controlled experiments,
to analyze the computational performance of rea-
soning in these representations. The experiments
compare different representations obtained, for
example, by changing the basic ontology of the
domain or by varying the degree of use of in-
direct effect laws through domain constraints.
This study has helped to expose the main sources
of computational difficulty in the reasoning and
suggest some methodological guidelines for rep-
resenting complex domains. Although our work
has been carried out within one particular high-
level description language, we believe that the re-
sults, especially those that relate to the problems
of representation, are independent of the specific
modeling language.
1 Introduction and Background
Over the last decade several new frameworks for reasoning
about actions and change have been proposed. Together
with the original frameworks of the situation and event cal-
culi, we have seen a number of different action descrip-
tion languages emerging with recent implemented proto-
type systems [3, 1, 4, 7]. Many of these languages have
been motivated by the desire to have simple representa-
tion frameworks, with semantics that relate more directly
to the natural intended meaning of their statements. They,
therefore, aspire to provide high-level representations of
domains that are close to their natural specification.
This paper studies the problem of modeling complex do-
mains of reasoning about actions and change within high-
level action description languages. It aims to expose the
main problems involved in this representation task and to
study the computational behaviour of the ensuing represen-
tations. It considers the Zoo domain, proposed at the Logic
Modeling Workshop of the ETAI electronic communica-
tion forum [2], as one representative complex domain that
frameworks of reasoning about actions and change should
aim to capture.
A complex domain brings together a number of differ-
ent problems associated with reasoning about actions and
change, such as ramifications, non-determinism and con-
currency. Although all these aspects have been exten-
sively studied and several solutions have been proposed
these studies are largely done for one problem in isolation
and with little attention to the computational behaviour of
these solutions. In this work we study how we can use
the knowhow generated over the years in these separate
problems, in order to represent complex and realistic do-
mains that encompass together all these different features.
Despite the fact that we will use a particular representa-
tion framework, that of the Language E , we believe that the
results apply more generally. This language encompasses
(partial) solutions to the main problems of reasoning about
action and change that are based on the same principles
used by most of the other approaches. Hence the findings
of our work, especially those that refer to the representa-
tional task would apply to other formalisms as well.
In particular, we investigate two main issues of concern:
(a) can we represent complex domains in a natural way
using directly the given natural ontology of the problem
domain and (b) what features of such a representation can
affect (and how) its computational behaviour. Our method
of study uses an empirical investigation through a series of
controlled experiments. In some of these experiments we
compare different representations by varying, for example,
the basic ontology of the domain or the degree of use of
indirect effect laws through domain constraints. In other
experiments, we investigate the performance of a fixed rep-
resentation as we vary the type of problems we consider,
e.g by varying the degree of incompleteness of information
in a scenario or by varying the complexity of the narrative
with irrelevant action occurrences.
These experiments help to analyze the computational diffi-
culties of the reasoning by exposing their main sources. In
turn, they suggest methodological guidelines on how to de-
velop complete representations of complex domains with
improved computational properties.
In the rest of this section we present briefly the specific
action description language that we will use in our mod-
eling study. Section 2 studies the main problems faced in
the task of representing a complex domain (by analyzing
these for the Zoo domain). Section 3 discusses some of
the experiments carried out to study the computational be-
haviour of representations and presents their main conclu-
sions. Section 4 discusses the overall conclusions drawn
from our work.
1.1 The Action Description Language E
Action description languages have been developed over the
last years to provide high level representation frameworks
for theories about actions and change. They generally do
not have an explicit representation of the frame axioms and
they have been extended to address the ramification and
qualification problems. They have been motivated by the
need to have simple representation frameworks with natu-
ral semantics that relate more directly to the natural inter-
pretations of the domains.
We will consider the problem of modeling complex do-
mains within the particular action description Language E
[7, 8]. The vocabulary of the Language E consists of a set
Φ of fluent constants, a set of action constants, and a par-
tially ordered set 〈Π,〉 of time-points. This vocabulary
depends each time on the domain being modeled. A fluent
literal is either a fluent constant F or its negation ¬F . In
the current implementation of the language, the only time
structure that is supported is that of the natural numbers,
so we restrict our attention here mainly to domains of this
type.
Domain descriptions in the Language E are collections of
the following types of statements (where A is an action
constant, T is a time-point, F is a fluent constant, L is a
fluent literal and C is a set of fluent literals):
• t-propositions of the form: L holds-at T
• h-propositions of the form: A happens-at T
• c-propositions of the form: A initiates F when C or,
A terminates F when C
• r-propositions of the form: L whenever C
• p-propositions of the form: A needs C.
For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to describe
the semantics of the language in an informal way, giving
the intended meaning of each type of sentence and de-
scribing the basic tenets of the reasoning supported. T-
propositions record observations that particular fluents hold
or do not hold at particular time-points. H-propositions
state that particular actions occur at particular time-points.
C-propositions state general “action laws” – the intended
meaning of “A initiates F when C” is that “C is a min-
imally sufficient set of conditions for an occurrence of A
to initiate F ”. R-propositions, also called ramifications or
domain constraints, serve a dual role in that they describe
both static constraints between fluents and ways in which
fluents may be indirectly affected by action occurrences.
As a constraint this must be satisfied as a classical implica-
tion at any time point. The intended meaning of “L when-
ever C” is that “at every time-point that C holds, L holds,
and hence every action occurrence that brings about C also
brings about L”. P-propositions state necessary conditions
for an action to occur.
The semantics of E are based on a notion of a model of a
domain D that assigns a truth value to each fluent at each
time point. A model encompasses two basic requirements:
Persistence Direct and indirect action laws, stated by c-
propositions and through r-propositions respectively,
are the only way to bring about a change (over time)
in the truth value of a fluent, when an appropriate ac-
tion occurs. This new value persists in time from then
onwards, until another such point of change.
Consistency The model must satisfy as classical impli-
cations the r-propositions at each time point and as
facts the t-propositions together with all the pre-
conditions C at times T that follow from each p-
proposition A needs C and associated h-proposition
A happens-at T .
Given a consistent domain D and a query or goal G com-
prising a set of t-propositions, we say that G is a credulous
or possible conclusion of D iff there is a model of D in
which G is true and that G is a skeptical or necessary
conclusion of D iff G is true in all models of D.
As an example, consider the following simple “bulb
domain” with action constants SwitchOn, SwitchOff and
Break and fluents Light and Normal:
SwitchOn initiates Light when {Normal}
SwitchOff terminates Light
Break terminates Normal
¬Light whenever {¬Normal}
SwitchOn needs {¬Light}
SwitchOn happens-at 2
Normal holds-at 0
This domain has as a skeptical conclusion Light
holds-at 4, but the conclusion is only credulous when
we remove the last sentence.
The Language E has been implemented [9] via an
argumentation-based translation of the language. This sys-
tem, called E-RES, can support directly a variety of modes
of common sense reasoning such as: default persistence
in credulous or skeptical form, assimilation of observa-
tions and their diagnosis possibly under incomplete infor-
mation, as well as combinations of these. The computa-
tional model on which this is based integrates argumenta-
tion goal-oriented proofs for default persistence, together
with classical theorem proving techniques for the satisfac-
tion of the constraints expressed in a domain. It also em-
ploys a (weak) notion of syntactic relevance in order to help
focus the computation to the relevant part of the theory.
This argumentation-based reformulation also extends the
Language E allowing its action laws to be treated as default
laws.
2 Complex Domain Representations
In this section we study how the Zoo domain, defined at the
Logic Modeling Workshop (LMW) [2], can be represented
in the Language E . We will follow closely the presenta-
tion of the domain and guidelines given at LMW trying to
address all the issues raised there. This section is there-
fore best read in conjunction with the documentation avail-
able at LMW. We will present the different aspects of rep-
resenting such a complex domain, while trying to expose
the main problems faced and choices made.
The LMW describes the Zoo domain as ”...a world contain-
ing the main ingredients of a classical zoo: cages, animals
in the cages, gates between two cages, as well as gates be-
tween a cage and the exterior. In the Zoo world there are an-
imals of several species, including humans. Actions in the
world may include movement within and between cages,
opening and closing gates, ..., riding animals, etc.”
2.1 Background Landscape and Active Structure
Our first task is to represent the landscape and active
structure of the domain i.e. describe the background in-
formation of the Zoo environment and the objects that pop-
ulate it. This information is generally taken to be static, not
changing over time.
For this type of information the Language E has a simple
facility of using constant fluents and declaring the static
state of affairs for these at some initial time point (time 0).
For example, we declare the known animals in the domain
by a set of statements of the following form:
animal(−) is constant
animal(john) holds-at 0
animal(jane) holds-at 0
animal(elly) holds-at 0
...
In addition, we can use ramification statements to represent
static information that is derived from other such informa-
tion e.g. that “an animal is large when it is an adult and
belongs to a large species”:
animal is large(A) whenever {animal is adult(A),
animal species(A,S), species is large(S)}.
In the same way, we represent the zoo terrain by
declaring all its positions and the neighbor rela-
tion via a constant fluent neighbor pos( , ) and
ramification statements to express its properties e.g.
neighbor pos(P1, P2) whenever {neighbor pos(P2, P1)}
for the symmetry of this relation.
We then reason with the Closed World Assumption on
these static fluent predicates at time 0 and project their truth
value unchanged to any other time point. If complete infor-
mation for a background fluent predicate is not known at 0,
then this predicate would not be declared as constant and
thus would be interpreted under the Open World Assump-
tion with the possibility to assume its truth value.
We note that the inherent propositional nature of the Lan-
guage E does pose some representational restrictions. We
need for example to define the primary typing constants,
which enumerate entities of the landscape and hence only
domains with known predefined entities can be repre-
sented. In general, the underlying ontology of the language
can be extended with a notion of sorted variables over a set
of finite sorts. The details of this are not important for this
work.
In this paper, we will assume that we have in the Zoo do-
main the basic types of animals, species, gates, locations
and positions, defined as constant fluents, and that any vari-
able (i=1,2,3,...) denoted by Ai, Si, Gi, Li, or Pi has the
respective type.
2.2 Action Effect Laws
Till now we have only been concerned with the static
aspects of the representation of the domain i.e. repre-
senting information at one time slice. The central part
of any domain of reasoning about actions and change
is that of its Action laws specifying the effects of ac-
tions. In the Language E action laws are represented di-
rectly via c-propositions. For example, the effect of the
move to position(A,P ) action in the Zoo domain, that
the animal “A” takes the position “P” is represented by:
move to position(A,P ) initiates animal pos(A,P )
when {reachable(A,P )}1.
Here this effect law depends on the condition that at the
time of the action the position “P” is reachable by “A”,
namely that “P” is an adjacent position to the position of
the animal “A” at the time of the action. This means that
an instance of the action move to position(A,P ) could
occur without successfully reaching “P”. Alternatively, we
can remove this condition from the effect law and set it as
a pre-condition for the action to occur via the statement:
move to position(A,P ) needs {reachable(A,P )}.
This choice depends on how we wish to interpret the occur-
rence of events in a given narrative. If when given an event
we mean that this event has successfully occurred, then this
alternative is more appropriate and allows for more conclu-
sions to be drawn, given an action occurrence. For exam-
ple, we would include the statement
move to position(A,P ) needs {¬rides(A,A1)}
to capture the requirement that a rider cannot perform the
move to position action at the time that s/he is riding. Un-
der this interpretation of event occurrences this way of rep-
resenting these preconditions allows us to draw more con-
clusions from knowledge that an action has occurred. If
then, we are given that move to position(john, p1) hap-
pened at time T then we would conclude that john is not
riding any (known) animal at T . Depending on other infor-
mation in the domain we maybe able to project this back-
ward or forward in time.
The above law of change for the action
move to position(A,P ) expresses a direct effect.
This action can also have other effects, for example that
1Note that the current version of the E -RES system, that im-
plements the Language E , requires that the typing of each variable
of a fluent or action to be stated explicitly each time the fluent or
action is used in a statement. Hence in E -RES this will written as:
move to position(A,P ) initiates animal pos(A,P )
when {animal(A), position(P ), reachable(A,P )}.
a rider A1 of the animal A will also acquire the new
position P , when A moves to P . In comparison, this
is not a direct effect but nevertheless, as argued in the
recent literature (e.g. [11]), actions should be allowed to
have such indirect effects. This poses a dilemma in the
representation. Indirect effects could be represented either
by explicit direct effect laws or via the domain constraints
(or ramification statements) of the theory. In the above
example we could have the additional direct laws:
move to position(A,P ) initiates animal pos(A1, P )
when {rides(A1, A)},
move to position(A,P ) terminates animal pos(A,P1)
when {animal pos(A,P1)}
for moving an animal’s rider along with the animal and ter-
minating the animal’s current position, respectively. On the
other hand, we could omit these, since the following do-
main constraints (stating that an animal’s rider always has
the same position with the ridden animal and that an animal
cannot be at two positions at the same time) would generate
the required effects indirectly:
animal pos(A1, P ) whenever {animal pos(A,P ),
rides(A1, A)},
¬animal pos(A,P1) whenever {animal pos(A,P ),
P1 6= P}.
However, such domain constraints are also needed in the
representation to suitably restrict the assumptions that we
might make while reasoning, when we have incomplete in-
formation in the theory.
Hence a dilemma emerges, either (1) to use direct laws to
explicitly enumerate all possible effects of an action to-
gether with domain constraints which do not generate in-
direct effects, but simply act as integrity constraints for as-
sumptions relating to incomplete fluents or (2) to use di-
rect laws for the basic effects of an action and let the do-
main ramification constraints generate the other effects in-
directly. We will see below that these two choices can be
semantically different and that they differ in their compu-
tational performance.
2.3 Domain Constraints
To represent the whole Zoo domain we need to define
all direct action laws for each of the type of actions to-
gether with their pre-conditions (as we have done above
for move to position) and state the various domain con-
straints that the specification of the problem requires. In
addition, to the domain constraints given above, we also
have several other statements. For example, we have:
false whenever {animal species(A, human),
rides(A1, A)},
¬rides(A,A1) whenever {rides(A,A2), A1 6= A2}
to capture the fact that a human cannot be ridden and to
represent the fact that an animal cannot ride two animals
at the same time. Here the first domain is written in this
particular way as a denial to indicate that it is not necessary
to produce indirect effects through it.
The domain constraints are also used to define various aux-
iliary dynamic predicates that we need, such as reachable
used above:
reachable(A,P ) whenever {animal pos(A,P1),
neighbor(P1, P )},
¬reachable(A,P ) whenever {animal pos(A,P1),
¬neighbor(P1, P )}
Note that here we do have the option (or dilemma) to de-
fine such dynamic predicates via direct effect laws of the
actions, but this would be more complex and non-modular
requiring the full enumeration of all cases where the flu-
ent reachable could be affected. Its definition through the
above domain constraints and their indirect effects that they
embody, provides a compact and modular way of represent-
ing such a dynamic predicate.
2.4 Issues in the choice of Representation
We return now to study in more detail the above dilemma
and in particular how this is related to non-determinism in
the domain and its representation. One of the actions of
the Zoo domain, that of throwoff(A1, A2), is specified to
be non-deterministic. Animal A1 throws off its back A2
and the latter can land at any position reachable from their
common position at the time of the throw. As there could
be many such reachable positions and we do not know at
which one the animal would fall this is a non-deterministic
action. The argumentation semantics of the Language E
allows us to represent such a non-deterministic action law
in the same way as any other law:
throwoff(A1, A2) initiates animal pos(A2, P )
when {reachable(A2, P )}.
This effect law does not contain any explicit qualifications
to state that the animal would fall in one position only pro-
vided that it does not fall on anyone of the other (reachable)
positions. This qualification is implicitly produced by the
domain constraint that an animal cannot have two differ-
ent positions at the same time. The combination of these
two statements captures the non-determinism of the action.
An inconsistency is not produced (although apparently it
would be), because for each direct initiation of a partic-
ular position P that the action law produces, the domain
constraint then produces the indirect effect that all other
positions are terminated. In this way each position can be
chosen. Note that it is important that the blockage of the
other positions is not captured simply by the static applica-
tion of the constraint, but that at the same time the position
of an animal changes to P we also have a change with re-
gards to all the other positions, namely they “begin to be
false”.
We therefore see a useful need for the production of indi-
rect effects, i.e. of change through the domain constraints.
This provides a natural mechanism of implicit qualification
of the several direct laws for a non-deterministic action.
Alternatively, we would need to qualify explicitly the di-
rect law with the condition that the animal can not be at
any other position. This would be complex and difficult to
express because the qualifications to the action law need to
refer to the state of the world after the action has occurred.
The same behaviour can also be observed in the case
of concurrent actions whose effects are contradictory.
Consider for example the simultaneous occurrence of a
getoff(A,A1, P ) and a move to position(A1, P1) ac-
tion, at a time when the animal A is riding another animal
A1. The first action requires that A has the position P as
its direct effect, while the second action would give that A
has the different position P1 since A is riding A1. Again,
the above constraint that an animal can have only one po-
sition at a time, acts as a qualifier and splits this scenario
in a non-deterministic way into two possibilities. In effect,
in the first case A manages to get off before A1 moves,
whereas in the second case A1 moves first and then A gets
off. The domain constraint gives an implicit qualification
to the two effect laws involved, in a way that would be very
difficult (and unnatural) to represent explicitly.
Concurrent action scenaria also show the main difference
between direct and indirect effect laws. Let us return to
the indirect effect law that a rider acquires the same posi-
tion of the animal that s/he is riding and compare it with its
direct effect law counterpart as given above. A difference
between the two laws shows up when we consider, for ex-
ample, the concurrent getoff and move to position sce-
nario, above. The direct law would allow the rider to move
to the new position with the animal, whereas the indirect
law would not generate this effect. This is because the con-
dition of rides in the direct law case needs to hold at the
exact time of the action, while in the indirect law case this
needs to hold at an infinitesimal time (or next time point)
after this, so that both conditions in the ramification can
hold together to produce its conclusion. Indeed, due to the
simultaneous getoff action, rides holds at the time of these
actions, but not later as it is terminated by this action un-
conditionally. Hence, in this concurrent scenario we would
not get the second possibility of the indirect generation of
the rider moving with the animal.
In this way we see that direct laws can be stronger than a
corresponding indirect effect law and in fact could be used
to break non-determinism when we do not want this. To see
this better and show its significance for the task of modeling
a domain, let us consider a case where the non-determinism
could exist as a result of the occurrence of one action alone.
Consider the domain constraint that two animals at differ-
ent positions cannot ride each other:
¬rides(A,A1) whenever {animal pos(A,P ),
animal pos(A1, P1), P1 6= P}.
This would then give indirect effects of the termination of
riding when we perform actions that change the position
of the rider alone (such as getoff or throwoff ). But
it would also give the indirect effect that riding is termi-
nated when the animal moves and hence it changes its po-
sition relative to its rider. In fact, adding the above ram-
ification to the representation and performing an action
move to position(A1, P1), at a time point where the an-
imal A1 is ridden by another animal, results in two pos-
sibilities: either the rider comes off and is at the original
position of A1, or the rider stays on and is at the new po-
sition P1 where the animal has moved to. With regards to
the effect of the action move to position(A1, P1) on the
position of the rider the action is non-deterministic.
In this case we do not want this and we have a preference
for the rider to move along with the animal that it rides. We
can achieve this preference in a natural way by explicitly
stating the preferred effect through a direct effect law. De-
spite the fact that we have a domain constraint that gives,
as an indirect effect, that the rider moves along with the an-
imal, we also represent this explicitly by a direct initiation
law for the action move to position(A,P ), i.e. we keep
both sentences in the dilemma presented above in this sec-
tion. This then blocks the indirect effect of terminating the
riding by the movement of the animal as the required con-
dition for this, namely that the rider is at a different position
immediately after the action, cannot now be supported due
to the strong argument of changing its position to that of
the animal’s new position through the new direct law and
the constraint that the rider can only have one position at
a time. The explicit statement of the direct law has given
preference to it.
In summary, we see that the ramifications and their indirect
effects provide an implicit form of qualification through the
general constraint properties of the domain. This means
that the theory treats its effect laws as default laws where
one can qualify another through these constraints. The di-
rect effect laws set out preferences amongst conflicting pos-
sibilities. The redundancy of repeating an indirect law as a
direct law as well, forms a natural way of setting a pref-
erence. We give emphasis to effects by articulating them
explicitly.
2.5 An example Scenario
Closing this section, we show how a particular scenario
can be represented. A scenario is given by stating events,
i.e. specific instances of actions that occurred (through h-
propositions) and observations, that is values of fluents at
specific time points (through t-propositions). For example,
throwoff(elly, john) happens-at 1
move to position(john, p1) happens-at 2
mount animal(john, dumpo) happens-at 3
reachable(john, p1) holds-at 2
represents the scenario that elly threw off john, who
then observed that position p1 was reachable, moved to
position p1, and then mounted dumpo. In this sce-
nario we would reason to rides(john, elly) at time 1
or 0 as a necessary (or skeptical) conclusion, but that
animal pos(john, p2) at time 2, where p2 is any neigh-
bor of p1, is a possible (or credulous) conclusion. At
time 4 onwards we can conclude that rides(john, dumpo)
is necessarily true. But if we are given also
that move to position(dumpo, p3) happens-at 3, then
rides(john, dumpo) at 4 will only be a possible con-
clusion. Observing that animal pos(john, p3) holds-at 5
i.e that john and dumpo have the same position then
rides(john, dumpo) at 4 would be a necessary conclu-
sion.
3 Computational Behaviour of
Representations
In this section we study empirically, via suitable controlled
experiments, the computational behaviour of a representa-
tion and try to ascertain what factors of the representation
might or might not affect this behaviour. We have con-
ducted two major types of experiments: (a) given a fixed
representation of the Zoo domain, we have examined var-
ious scenaria that differ in the amount of given informa-
tion, its relevancy to the queries and the type of queries
performed, and (b) given some fixed scenarios and queries,
we have examined various representations that differ on the
extend the action effects are represented directly/indirectly
and on the richness of the vocabulary used. The basic scale
of the domains on which we have carried these experiments
is of the order of 3 thousand ground clauses per time point.
A scenario typically spans over 3-6 time points.
As the representative results2 presented in figure 1 sug-
gest, increasing the information in a scenario can affect
positively the computational performance, even if the extra
2All numbers shown in the tables of this paper are in seconds
measured on a Pentium II, 266 MHz, PC. The absolute value of
these times are not important as the purpose of the experiments is
to compare different cases.
information given explicitly in the scenario is a necessary
conclusion of this.
Figure 1: Complete vs Incomplete Scenario Knowledge
These experiments have also shown that it is possible to use
simple syntactic relevancy checks to focus the computation
to the relevant (w.r.t. the query at hand) part of the domain.
In fact, the experiments have helped us develop further a
semantically enhanced notion of relevancy that neutralizes
to some extent the effect of additional irrelevant informa-
tion in the scenario. Figure 2 shows that the addition of
irrelevant actions in a scenario does not have a significant
impact on the computation. The stability under irrelevant
information also depends strongly on the type of represen-
tation used and the choice of vocabulary, as we will see
below in the second class of experiments. Finally, as ex-
pected in some cases, particularly in scenarios with a lot of
missing information, skeptical queries can be significantly
slower than the corresponding credulous queries.
Figure 2: Relevant vs Additional Irrelevant Actions
As mentioned above, the second class of experiments con-
siders changes in the representation. Figure 3 compares the
computational behaviour between representations which
use direct effect laws to a different degree. In general, using
only direct laws gives a significantly better computational
performance than a representation that uses to a maximum
indirect effect laws. We should note though, as we have
seen in section 2, that the first representation cannot al-
ways fully capture the domain e.g. the non-determinism
of conflicting concurrent actions. In such cases, this be-
comes inconsistent and is unable to return an answer. It is
also noteworthy, that when effect laws are duplicated in the
representation both directly and indirectly, the behaviour
varies from being as good as a representation that primar-
ily uses direct effects, to being worse than a representation
that primarily uses indirect effects. This depends mostly on
whether the specific laws that are duplicated as direct laws
can generate a large number of additional indirect effects.
Another series of experiments has examined the effects on
the computational behaviour of using an enriched, more
specific vocabulary of the domain in the representation.
Starting from a minimally sufficient vocabulary, we have
Figure 3: Direct vs Indirect Effect Laws
developed a number of other equivalent representations us-
ing more specialized vocabularies that separate explicitly
different specific cases for an action, e.g. the single action
fluent move to position is replaced by move in cage,
enter cage and exit cage. Similarly, we can distinguish
explicitly in the vocabulary some of the fluent properties
e.g. those that refer to the (2 dimensional) position on the
floor from the properties that refer to the third dimension
off the floor. We have found that a representation that uses,
in this way, a carefully selected ontology and proper typ-
ing can significantly improve its computational efficiency.
This occurs mainly by reducing the number of assumptions
(sometimes impossible ones) from being considered in the
reasoning.
With regards to the issue of scaling of the computational
behaviour of the representations, our experiments suggest
that the representation that maximizes the use of direct ef-
fect laws scales up relatively well. These are preliminary
results, tested only on small sized domains that contain up
to a maximum of 15 positions in the terrain, correspond-
ing to around 25,000 ground clauses. Representations with
non-minimal use of indirect effect laws scale up poorly.
In general, our empirical study has revealed two main com-
putational bottlenecks: (a) the number of additional conse-
quences drawn from the conclusions of a query that need
to be considered to ensure that the query can be consis-
tently satisfied in the whole domain and (b) the number of
counter-proofs (counter-arguments) that are generated via
persistence on an assumption needed to prove the query.
Our experiments have helped us address (at least partly)
these difficulties. The enhanced notion of relevancy, which
helps us avoid unnecessary re-computation of known con-
sequences and a (non-minimal) choice of vocabulary that
distinguishes explicitly different scenaria, can result in sig-
nificant improvement of computational behaviour. Another
potential source of improvement can come from the way
we use direct and indirect effect laws. Generally, the more
use of direct laws the better the performance, but there is
a trade off here with the reduction in modularity and read-
ability of a representation that uses direct laws extensively.
In some cases the computational gain is relatively small to
justify this and a representation that combines the use of
these two types of effect laws is overall better.
We have also begun to examine the same problems using
a different computational model in place of the argumenta-
tion based model used so far. We have translated the Lan-
guage E to a SAT theory so that we can then employ a SAT
solver for query answering. This translation is not complete
and supports only a restricted class of domains. In particu-
lar, it does not support domains with non-deterministic ac-
tions, or concurrent actions that generate conflicting effects
nor domains in which the ramifications form cycles. Initial
results indicate that the SAT-based approach has a more sta-
ble behaviour. They also indicate that it scales up better as
we increase the number of actions in a scenario, but not so
as we increase the number of positions in the terrain of the
Zoo domain. An interesting difference of the SAT-based
approach is the fact that it is difficult to employ relevancy
notions in it. Some simple forms of relevancy can be used,
but this requires that for each query we need to translate the
relevant part of the domain theory afresh and this can have
an adverse effect on its performance.
4 Related Work and Conclusions
We have studied how to model complex domains of action
and change based on the theoretical foundations that the
community at large has developed over the last decade. In
particular, we have addressed the challenge set by the Logic
Modeling Workshop [2], to apply this theory in modeling
complex domains that encompass together many different
aspects of the problem. As in the related work of [5, 6, 12]
our work shows that the existing frameworks of action de-
scription languages are sufficiently expressive to meet this
representational challenge.
Moreover, applying this otherwise well understood theory
of reasoning about actions and change to capture complex
domains has helped to expose more clearly some problems.
For example, it has shown a link between non-determinism
and an implicit qualification of effect laws via the domain
constraints where the explicit representation of an indirect
effect law as a direct law can give this higher priority. As
mentioned in the introduction, we believe that these consid-
erations are independent of the particular framework that
we have used to carry out our study and that they would
apply also to other approaches that are based on the same
underlying principles for developing a theory for reason-
ing about actions and change. Differences may arise in the
computational aspects of the different frameworks. For this
reason we have concentrated more on comparison exper-
iments and have tried to exposed inherent computational
problems. Also the propositional nature of the particular
framework that we have used could be limiting in the static
aspects of the representation, i.e. in the ability to represent
knowledge at any single time or situation. But this does
not affect the ability to represent the dynamic aspects of a
problem domain. At this initial stage of the study we be-
lieve that it is methodologically correct to de-couple these
two aspects and examine at a later stage how they would
affect each other.
Our study of the computational behaviour of representa-
tions has suggested some methodological guidelines for
modeling complex domains that can help us control their
computational performance. These include the balanced
use of direct and indirect effect laws and the adoption of
an appropriate vocabulary as presented in the previous sec-
tion. To cross check these comparison results it would be
useful to study similar experiments using other languages,
e.g. using the Causal Calculator [10] with its SAT based
computation. We also need to study how other mecha-
nisms, external to the reasoning, can help focus more the
computation to the relevant part of the theory.
More work is needed to understand better what factors can
influence the computational performance of a representa-
tion and how this would scale up. We also need to develop
a stricter methodology on how to choose a vocabulary for
a complex domain that would give it good computational
properties. In our work so far this choice was mostly mo-
tivated by the natural common sense reasoning that we as
humans apply to the domain and our use of a specific vo-
cabulary for it. In fact, a distinction between “natural” and
“formal” (or compact) representations emerges, where the
first type of representation uses a non-minimal enriched vo-
cabulary which helps it encode directly in the domain qual-
itative solutions to computational problems (e.g. the geom-
etry of a terrain) and thus results to a better computational
behaviour. This and its possible link to qualitative reason-
ing in AI is an interesting problem for future study.
Our work has been mainly motivated with trying to under-
stand a natural computational model of human common-
sense reasoning and how this is affected both by issues of
representation and methods of computation. In the future
we plan to investigate, through a series of cognitive experi-
ments, how natural are these representations and how well
they capture the human common sense reasoning in the do-
main of action and change.
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